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Three	ways	of	theorising	‘capture’:	when	politics	and
business	join	together
In	the	strongest-performing	liberal	democracies	the	separation	of	the	political	sphere	from	dominant	or	directly
controlling	business	influences	is	protected	by	a	range	of	‘blocked	exchanges’	(in	Michael	Walzer’s	terms).	But	in
authoritarian	regimes,	semi-democracies	and	flawed	liberal	democracies	it	is	common	for	business	interests	to	take
control	of	the	levers	of	political	power	acting	alongside	top	politicians,	with	a	joined-up	elite	or	‘oligarchy’	thereby
‘capturing’	the	state.	In	different	forms,	this	worldwide	phenomenon	can	be	seen	from	Russia	to	South	Africa	and
from	China	to	Brazil.	Frank	Vibert	outlines	three	ways	of	looking	at	these	situations,	and	stresses	the	difficulty	of
identifying	and	implementing	a	cure.
Campaign	to	‘get	money	out	of	politics’.	Picture:	Kristina	D.C.	Hoeppner/	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)	licence
An	essential	element	in	the	concept	of	‘capture’	is	that	it	refers	to	political	power	that	is	acquired	outside	the
legitimate	channels	for	exercising	political	authority	in	a	society.	Businesses	are	often	the	prime	movers	in	seeking
such	powers,	but	politicians	may	also	be	the	instigators	of	a	‘capture’	relationship	with	business.	Either	way,	citizens
are	the	likely	losers,	as	all	three	current	models	of	this	process	emphasise.
The	‘exchange’	model	sees	capture	as	a	product	of	mutual	exchange	occurring	between	a	dominant	politician	or
set	of	politicians	and	business.	The	politician	wants	money	–	for	example	to	fund	an	election	or	re-election
campaign,	to	reward	their	followers,	or	simply	to	build	their	own	personal	fortune.	Businesses	want	influence	over
political	decisions,	and	so	they	do	a	deal.	This	model	originated	in	the	context	of	regulation,	where	state	agencies
partly	or	largely	depend	on	quasi-voluntary	compliance	for	regulations	to	stay	up	to	date	and	effective.	To	operate
effectively	regulators	want	(and	often	need)	a	wide	range	of	information	held	by	businesses.	Businesses	will
accommodate	the	regulator	by	offering	the	information	in	exchange	for	influence	over	regulatory	policies	and	a	cosy
relationship	with	the	regulator.	The	advantages	of	exchanges	between	actors	with	different	interests	can	be
generalised	to	apply	across	politics	as	a	whole.
The	‘joint	enterprise’	model	by	contrast	sees	politicians	and	businesses	as	having	the	same	(essential)	goals,
and	largely	recognising	that	fact.	What	is	good	for	the	business	is	good	also	for	the	country,	and	vice	versa.	In	this
model,	the	initiative	to	start	a	‘capture’	relationship	may	come	from	a	dominant		politician	or	set	of	politicians,	who
want	the	material	and	wealth	rewards	that	business	can	offer	for	themselves	or	their	associates.	Naturally	enough,
though,	political	actors	wrap	up	such	motivations	within	a	narrative	for	public	consumption,	which	forcefully	claims
that	the	public	interest	is	also	being	served	when	the	goals	of	politics	also	help	the	goals	of	business.	For	example,
China’s	government	talks	about	the	benefits	of	rising	prosperity	for	all,	while	drawing	a	veil	over	the	relationship
between	the	political	leadership	and	business	leadership.
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The	‘constitutional’	model	can	be	traced	back	to	James	Madison	and	the	founding	of	American	democracy	at	the
end	of	the	18th	century.	Madison	saw	an	inherent	tension	in	a	democracy	between	giving	power	to	the	people	and
an	equal	need	to	respect	property	rights.	On	the	one	hand	there	was	a	danger	that	a	populist	majority	could	seize
businesses	and	land.	On	the	other	hand,	there	was	a	danger	that	over-powerful	property	and	business	interests
could	use	political	power	for	their	own	ends.	His	constitutional	‘solution’	lay	in	a	system	of	checks	and	balances
where	the	executive	power	and	the	legislative	power	held	each	other	in	check	and	an	independent	judiciary	held
the	ring.	‘Capture’	could	occur	when	these	checks	failed.
Different	diagnoses	–	different	‘remedies’
These	different	ways	of	looking	at	capture	lead	towards	different	remedies.	In	the	first,	exchange	model,	it	may	be
possible	in	liberal	democracies	to	break	the	connection	between	business	money	and	elections	by	limiting
permissible	election	expenses,	and	also	by	making	political	donations	fully	transparent	so	that	shareholders	can
object.
The	enterprise	model	is	more	difficult	to	address.	Some	exponents	of	this	approach	favour	privatisation	as	one	type
of	preventative	measure,	opening	up	previously	‘captured’	industries	to	more	normal	business	competition
pressures.	At	the	same	time,	however,	privatisation	can	be	used	by	politicians	to	reward	followers	and	to	build
channels	for	remuneration	(as	has	occurred	in	Russia).	At	the	least,	strong	standards	of	corporate	governance	are
called	for.
The	constitutional	model	calls	for	an	identification	of	weak	spots	within	a	country’s	constitution	and	action	to	fix
them.	In	many	countries	the	problem	may	originate	with	weak	electoral	processes	and	a	deficient	civil	society
unable	to	effectively	criticise	policy-makers.	There	are	insufficient	channels	for	citizens	to	show	their	disapproval,
get	rid	of	the	politicians	or	mobilise	the	strong	pressures	needed	to	achieve	constitutional	reform.
However	it	originates,	‘capture’	undermines	the	institutions	of	both	politics	and	the	market.	The	exchange	model
points	to	how	capture	can	destroy	trust	in	each.	The	enterprise	model	suggests	how	both	elites	focus	on	shared
power	or	wealth-aggrandisement	goals	can	destroy	the	wider	values	of	political	association	relating	to	the	character
of	a	society.	The	constitutional	model	points	to	the	fragility	of	checks	and	balances,	and	their	costs	when	they
insulate	‘capture’	relations	from	being	changed.
One	general	lesson	from	the	study	of	‘capture’	situations	is	that	when	we	think	about	the	rules	that	constitute	a
democratic	society	they	should	include	rules	of	corporate	governance	fully	alongside	the	more	familiar	‘democratic’
rules,	for	example,	governing	how	we	elect	legislatures	and	assemblies.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author,	not	the	position	of	Democratic	Audit.	
About	the	author
Frank	Vibert	was	a	senior	visiting	fellow	in	the	Department	of	Government	(LSE)	between
2008–2019	and	is	now	associate	with	CARR	(LSE)	and	fellow	of	the	Foundation	for	Law
Justice	and	Society,	Wolfson	College,	Oxford.	He	won	an	Open	History	Scholarship	to
Exeter	College,	Oxford	and	obtained	a	first	class	degree	in	Philosophy,	Politics	and
Economics	(PPE).	He	has	been	a	senior	advisor	at	the	World	Bank	in	Washington	DC	and
a	senior	fellow	at	UNU/WIDER	in	Helsinki.	He	co-founded	and	was	director	of	a	London
based	think	tank,	the	European	Policy	Forum,	between	1992	and	2008.	His	main	fields	of
interest	are	constitutional	theory	and	regulatory	governance,	including	international
governance	and	the	European	Union.	You	can	read	more	work	by	Frank	Vibert	at	vibertview.net.
Similar	Posts
Book	Review	|	Making	a	21st	Century	Constitution:	Playing	Fair	in	Modern	Democracies	by	Frank	Vibert
Making	a	21st	century	constitution:	the	rules	we	have	established	for	democracies	are	now	outdated
Electoral	observation	missions	promote	competitive	elections	in	autocracies
Democratic Audit: Three ways of theorising ‘capture’: when politics and business join together Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-01-14
Permalink: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2020/01/14/three-ways-of-theorising-capture-when-politics-and-business-join-together/
Blog homepage: https://www.democraticaudit.com/
Book	Review	|	The	Authoritarian	Public	Sphere:	Legitimation	and	Autocratic	Power	in	North	Korea,	Burma
and	China	by	Alexander	Dukalskis
The	success	of	populist	radical	right	parties	is	not	a	result	of	heightened	participation	in	politics	by
authoritarians
Democratic Audit: Three ways of theorising ‘capture’: when politics and business join together Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-01-14
Permalink: https://www.democraticaudit.com/2020/01/14/three-ways-of-theorising-capture-when-politics-and-business-join-together/
Blog homepage: https://www.democraticaudit.com/
